It is a fundamental rule of our justice system that it should be administered in public (Attorney General v Leveller Magazine Ltd [1979] AC 440). In the criminal justice system this rule generally operates so as to require individuals who are charged with an offence to give their home address in open court. But what is the position if the accused claim that confirming their address in open court will expose them and their family to attack? Are they entitled to demand that their address be given in camera? This is an issue which was recently posed in the case of R(Harper) & Anor v Aldershot Magistrates Court & Anor [2010] EWHC 1319 Admin. In this case, two senior police officers who had been charged with the offence of misconduct in public office sought to judicially review a ruling of the Magistrates Court that they must each confirm their address in open court. The officers, who had been suspended from duty, claimed that the ruling was unlawful because there was a real and genuine fear of reprisal and the safety of the officers and their family was at risk. The Court rejected the claim on the basis that any fears which the officers may have had were unreasonable, particularly because publication of their address would not in fact enhance any risk that they faced (notably, the addresses could simply have been accessed through the electoral roll). In reaching the conclusion that the ruling was lawful, the Court took into account not least Lord Diplock’s judgment in Belfast Telegraph Newspaper Limited’s Application [1997] NI QBD 309. In that case, Lord Diplock held that information may be withheld in criminal proceedings on the basis that this was necessary to serve the public interest in the administration of justice but that it could not be withheld simply in the interest of protecting ‘the private welfare of those caught up in that administration’ (at page 314F). The Court in Harper noted that there might be circumstances in which the individual’s well-being may overlap with the administration of justice such that the information can be withheld in the public interest. However, these were not the facts of the instant case. Notably, there is no analysis in the judgment of the application of Article 8 ECHR. Nor further is there any explicit consideration of the rights of the families of the accused. Query what role these considerations would have played if the facts of Harper had been less clear-cut.
PLANNING DECISIONS & HISTORIC BUILDINGS: PUBLIC SCRUTINY TRUMPS COMMERCIAL CONFIDENTIALITY
May 28th, 2010 by Robin HopkinsLocal planning authorities will wish to take careful note of the recent Tribunal decision in Bristol City Council v ICO and Portland and Brunswick Squares Association (EA/2010/0012), which will please residents’ associations, conservation groups and others wishing to scrutinise planning decisions about historic buildings.
PPG 15 (a Planning Policy Guidance document) requires that, where a building is listed or makes a positive contribution to a conservation area, it should only be demolished if there is “clear and convincing evidence that all reasonable efforts have been made to sustain existing uses or find viable new uses and these efforts have failed”. Bristol CC granted permission to demolish a listed building in its ownership, relying for PPG 15 purposes on the developer’s viability reports which apparently showed alternative uses of the building to be commercially unviable. It subsequently refused to disclose those reports, relying on the exemption at regulation 12(5)(e) of the EIR 2004, which applies to the extent that disclosure “would adversely affect … the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided by law to protect a legitimate economic interest”.
The requesters argued that a reasonable person would not regard these reports as confidential because the planning process is one that assumes and requires public involvement. The Tribunal disagreed, and found that regulation 12(5)(e) was engaged.
It went on to find, however, that the public interest favoured disclosure, given the decisiveness of these reports in a matter which had aroused substantial local controversy. The Tribunal considered it proper to take into account the “general mismatch between the resources of developers and residents’ groups” and noted that “so far as PPG 15 viability reports are concerned, it seems to us that developers will not be able to refuse to supply them if they want to obtain the relevant consent but that, given their hypothetical nature, it may be possible for them to construct such reports in a way that does not reveal sensitive commercial information specific to themselves”.
The Tribunal stressed that it was not setting down a general precedent concerning planning decisions, and that absent PPG 15 (or, presumably, its successor guidance PPS 5) or council ownership of the building in question, its decision might have been different. Where those two factors are present however, public accountability trumps commercial confidentiality.
SAFETY RISK JUSTIFIES WITHHOLDING OF ANIMAL EXPERIMENT INFORMATION
April 21st, 2010 by Robin HopkinsThe ‘health and safety’ exemption under s. 38 FOIA has received relatively little attention at Tribunal level. It was recently relied upon successfully in People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals Europe (PETA) v IC & Oxford University (EA/2009/0076).
Experiments performed on a macaque by an Oxford University Professor had been featured in a BBC documentary in November 2006. The appellant pressure group sought extracts from the relevant project licence concerning, for example, the work plan and purposes behind those experiments. The Tribunal applied the well-established ‘prejudice’ principles from Hogan and Oxford City Council v IC (EA2005/0026 and EA2005/0030), ‘endanger’ (the term used in s. 38) being synonymous with ‘prejudice’. It found that s. 38 was engaged, given the indiscriminate nature of the violence tending to accompany the publication of information about animal experiments at Oxford.
In terms of the public interest test, notable points from the decision include:
a) PETA argued that the information would assist its decisions on applications for judicial review, but, based on Secretary of State for the Home Department v BUAV [2008] EWCA Civ 417, the Tribunal observed that there was limited scope for judicial second-guessing of scientists’ opinions.
b) The Tribunal accepted that limited external scrutiny was available, but was persuaded of the robustness of the internal scrutiny and oversight mechanisms applied here.
c) Oxford put forward a collateral public interest argument, namely that safety risks would deter future research, thereby impeding the advancement of scientific knowledge and human health. PETA argued that this was too remote from the health and safety risks for which s. 38 catered, but the Tribunal rejected this ‘remoteness’ objection (though it found this public interest factor to be inapplicable on these facts).
Given the frequency with which such points arise in appeals by pressure groups, these observations from the PETA case may come to have wider application.
OFCOM & THE AGGREGATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS: UPDATE
November 9th, 2009 by Anya ProopsOn 17 November 2009, the Supreme Court will hear the Information Commissioner’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Office of Communications v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 90 (Ofcom). In Ofcom, the Court of Appeal held that, when multiple exceptions were engaged in respect of particular information, the public interest test provided for under regulation 12(1)(b) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 would operate so as to entitle the public authority to aggregate all the different public interest factors relating to all applicable exceptions in a single, compendious public interest balancing exercise. This judgment was controversial, not least because it represented a departure from the well-established approach of tailoring public interest considerations to the individual exception in issue. Notably, in a recent Information Tribunal decision, the Tribunal highlighted some of the practical difficulties posed by the adoption of the aggregate approach to the public interest test (South Gloucestershire v Information Commissioner (EA/2009/0032), §§48-52). 11KBW’s Clive Lewis and Akhlaq Choudhury will be appearing on behalf of the Commissioner in the Supreme Court.
The Law Officers’ Convention and the Ministerial Code - High Court Judgment
August 7th, 2009 by Robin HopkinsThe recent judgment in HM Treasury v Information Commissioner and Evan Owen [2009] EWHC 1811 (Admin) saw the High Court quash a decision by the Information Tribunal requiring HM Treasury to disclose whether or not it held advice from the Law Officers on the compatibility of the Financial Services and Markets Bill with the Human Rights Act.
By a long-standing constitutional Convention – recognised in the Ministerial Code – the fact that the Law Officers have been consulted is not disclosed outside government without the consent of the Attorney General. This is specifically accommodated in the qualified exemption under section 35(1)(c) FOIA. The Tribunal, however, had upheld the Commissioner’s decision that the public interest favoured disclosure in this case.
Blake J held that, in so doing, the Tribunal failed to afford due weight to three factors. First, the fact that section 35(1)(c) aimed not to supplant the Convention, but to preserve it subject to a public interest test. Secondly, the views of experienced civil servants on the consequences of departing from the Convention. Thirdly, those factors counting against disclosure that were based on generalised rather than specific harm. The Tribunal had also failed to evaluate for itself the strength of the public interest in disclosure in light of the extensive legal advice that had already been publicised on this issue.
Given that similar factors have been discussed in a number of other High Court judgments referred to by Blake J, this judgment makes a notable contribution to the jurisprudence on the public interest balancing test.
House of Lords Grants Permission in Ofcom
August 3rd, 2009 by Anya ProopsLast month the House of Lords granted the Information Commissioner permission to appeal the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Office of Communications v IC [2009] EWCA Civ 90 (‘Ofcom’). In Ofcom, the Court of Appeal considered the question of how the public interest test under regulation 12(5)(b) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (‘EIR’) applied where a number of different exceptions were engaged in respect of particular requested information. It held that, rather than conducting discrete public interest balancing exercises under each individual exception, the public authority could effectively bundle all the public interest considerations relevant to the applicable exceptions into a single compendious public interest balancing exercise. The Commissioner has now been granted permission to appeal the judgment to the newly constituted Supreme Court. 11KBW’s Ahlaq Choudury is acting on behalf of the Commissioner.
ICO seeks permission to appeal to House of Lords
March 26th, 2009 by Akhlaq ChoudhuryIn Ofcom v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 90, the Court of Appeal held that in applying the public interest test under the Environmental Information Regulations it is necessary to aggregate all public interest factors relating to all applicable exceptions and weigh these against the public interest in disclosure. This is a departure from the well-established approach of looking only at the public interest factors in respect of a particular exception to determine whether the public interest in maintaining that exception outweighs the public interest in disclosure. This change in approach will affect disclosure decisions under both the EIR and FOIA. The ICO has lodged a petition seeking permission to appeal to the House of Lords.
Revising FOIA?
March 6th, 2009 by Timothy Pitt-Payne QCTucked away in Jack Straw’s House of Commons statement (24th February 2009) about the veto on disclosure of the Iraq War Cabinet minutes is the following intriguing passage:
Shortly after he became Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister established a high-level inquiry into the 30-year rule under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Dacre of the Daily Mail. That report, published last month, proposed a reduction from 30 to 15 years of the time after which Cabinet minutes and other papers would automatically be released. I have already told the House that the Government favour a substantial reduction in the 30-year limit. In that context, the report also recommended that we consider protection under the Act for certain categories of information.
The reference to the Dacre Report relates to the following section in chapter 8 of the Report:
8.7 As we noted in Chapter Five, there are genuine concerns among some ministers and civil servants about the early release of particularly sensitive types of papers … Given that we are recommending a substantial reduction to the 30 year rule, we believe that the government may wish to look again at the exemptions set out in the FoI Act.
8.8 We therefore recommend that, in parallel with the adoption of a 15 year rule, the government, in consultation with interested parties, may wish to consider whether there is a case for enhanced protection of such categories of information.
So what may be under consideration is a change along the following lines. The 30 year rule would be replaced by a 15 year rule; and at the same time some categories of information that are at present covered by a qualified exemption under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 would become subject to absolute exemption. Possible candidates for this treatment might be Cabinet minutes, or some forms of policy advice in central Government. A change of this nature might not even need primary legislation; an attempt could be made to implement the change by making an order under section 7(3) of the Freedom of Information Act. This was the technique that was used in the recent (abandoned) attempt to amend FOIA in relation to MPs expenses: see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7839281.stm
I would make two brief comments. One is that the Dacre proposals in relation to the 30 year rule envisage that the change to a 15 year rule would be made over a long transitional period, coming fully into effect by 2025. Presumably any change in the FOIA exemptions would not be subject to any corresponding transition. A second is that the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) could not be amended in the same way, since they implement a European Directive. So if the FOIA exemptions are tightened, expect a great deal more argument about whether particular requests fall within FOIA or EIR.
For Jack Straw’s statement see:
For the Dacre Report see:
http://www2.nationalarchives.gov.uk/30yrr/30-year-rule-report.pdf
Court of Appeal Gives Judgment in Ofcom Case
February 26th, 2009 by Anya ProopsOn 20 February 2009, judgment was handed down in the case of Office of Communications v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 90. This is the first case under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) to be heard by the Court of Appeal. The Information Commissioner was represented by Akhlaq Choudhury of 11KBW. This is an important judgment affecting the general approach to the public interest test in determining whether information under the EIR should be disclosed. The judgment is also relevant to the application of the public interest test under FOIA. The case concerned a request made to Ofcom (the regulatory body for radio communications) for the disclosure of information as to the location of mobile phone masts, and in particular for that information to be disclosed in a format that would enable the requester to manipulate the underlying data using data-handling applications. Ofcom resisted disclosure on the basis that it would prejudice (a) public safety (by identifying mast locations to criminals) and (b) the intellectual property rights of the Mobile Network Operators (such rights being the database rights in the information). The Information Tribunal considered that there was a strong public interest in disclosure given, amongst other matters, the benefit to epidemiological research as to the effects of mobile phone mast radiation on the health of the public. The Tribunal considered that it was entitled to take that public interest into account notwithstanding the fact that such research would be likely to involve an infringement of database rights. In addressing the public interest balance, the Tribunal took the then well-established course of separately weighing the public interest in maintaining each of the exceptions relied upon against the public interest in disclosure. It did not aggregate all the public interest factors against disclosure. The Tribunal found that the public interest balance favoured disclosure.
On the general point of principle, namely the approach to be taken in weighing the public interest in maintaining the exemption against the public interest in disclosure, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Tribunal’s approach. The Court held that the public interest in maintaining each exemption should be aggregated and weighed against the public interest in disclosure. An exemption-by-exemption approach was still permissible provided that the matter is also looked at in the round at the end of the process by considering whether the aggregate public interest in maintaining the applicable exemptions outweighs the public interest in disclosure. However, the Court upheld the Tribunal’s’ approach in taking into account a factor as supporting the public interest in disclosure even where that factor involves a breach of third party intellectual property rights. The Court held that the legislative scheme is such that it is permissible to take such factors into account as an aspect of the public interest in disclosure. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to reconsider the public interest balance in accordance with the approach laid down by the Court.