Unforgettable that’s what you are – Google Spain revisited

October 13th, 2014 by Anya Proops

The debates over whether the CJEU’s judgment in Google Spain represents an unjustified attack on free speech rights have raged for months now. Interestingly, it seems that some judges at the local level at least are proving somewhat resistant to this highly privacy-centred judgment. Thus, according to online reports, in recent weeks a Dutch preliminary court has apparently held that a man convicted of a serious offence dating back over some years could not rely on Google Spain to have the links to websites referring to the offence excised. According to reports about the judgment (which seems only to be available in Dutch), the court held that information revealing that someone has committed an offence has relevance notwithstanding its vintage and, as such, should not be de-indexed by Google (see here). Outside of Europe, a judge sitting in the Israeli magistrate’s court has apparently refused to countenance a claim against Google based on the so-called right to be forgotten. According to a report in the Israel Hayom online newspaper, the judge held that imposing an obligation on Google to de-index results, even if they were defamatory, would entail converting Google unjustifiably into a ‘super-censor’ (see the report here). It will be interesting to see how the English courts, with their strong tradition of upholding free speech rights, will in due course seek to navigate their way through the challenging jurisprudential landscape set by the CJEU in Google Spain.

Anya Proops

Assessing the FOIA veto power

September 17th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

For those of you still following the Prince of Wales correspondence veto saga, and who have access to law journals in print or online, you may be interested to read the casenote published in the latest issue of the Law Quarterly Review discussing the Court of Appeal judgment. The casenote is by 11KBW and Panopticon stalwart Chris Knight. The full reference is CJS Knight, ‘The Veto in the Court of Appeal’ (2014) 130 LQR 552.

Loss of personal data: £20k award upheld on appeal

September 16th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

If you breach your legal duties as regards personal data in your control, what might you expect to pay by way of compensation to the affected individual? The received wisdom has tended to be something along these lines. First, has the individual suffered any financial loss? If not, they are not entitled to a penny under s. 13 DPA. Second, even if they get across that hurdle, how much should they get for distress? Generally, not very much – reported awards have tended to be very low (in the low thousands at most).

All of that is very comforting for data controllers who run into difficulties.

That picture is, however, increasingly questionable. “Damage” (the precondition for any award, under s. 13 DPA) could mean something other than “financial loss” – other sorts of damage (even a nominal sort of damage) can, it seems, serve as the trigger. Also, provided the evidence is sufficiently persuasive, it seems that awards – whether under the DPA or at common law (negligence) – could actually be substantial.

These trends are evident in the judgment of the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland in CR19 v Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland [2014] NICA 54.

The appellant, referred to as CR19, was a police officer with the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Due to his exposure to some serious terrorist incidents, he developed Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD); he also developed a habit of excessive alcohol consumption. He left the Constabulary in 2001. In 2002, there was a burglary at Castlereagh Police, apparently carried out on behalf of a terrorist organisation. Data and records on officers including CR19 were stolen.

The Constabulary admitted both negligence and a breach of the seventh data protection principle (failure to take appropriate technical and organisational measures). The issue at trial was the amount of compensation to which CR19 was entitled.

Note the losses for which CR19 sought compensation: he claimed that, as a result of the stress which that data loss incident caused him, his PTSD and alcohol problems worsened, he lost out on an employment opportunity and that his house had been devalued as a result of threats to the property and the package of security measures that had been implemented for protection.

The trial judge heard evidence from a number of parties, including medical experts on both sides. He found some aspects of CR19’s evidence unsatisfactory. Overall, however, he awarded CR19 £20,000 (plus interest) for the Constabulary’s negligence. He did not expressly deal with any award under s. 13 of the DPA.

CR19 appealed, saying the award was too low. His appeal was largely dismissed: the trial judge had been entitled to reach his conclusions on the evidence before him.

Further, the s. 13 DPA claim added nothing to the quantum. The Court of Appeal considered the cases of Halliday (a £750 award) and AB (£2,250) (both reported on Panopticon) and concluded as follows (para. 24):

“In this case we have earlier recorded that three eminent psychiatrists gave professional evidence as to the distress sustained by CR19 as a consequence of the break-in. While accepting that the breach and its consequences in this case are of a different order to the matters considered in Halliday or AB, we conclude that the damages for distress arising from the breach of the Data Protection Act must be considered to be subsumed into the judge’s award which, while rejected as too low by the appellant, was by no means an insignificant award. The assessment took account of the distress engendered by the breach of data protection. We cannot conceive of any additional evidence that might be relevant to any additional damages for distress in respect of breach of section 4. Accordingly, we affirm the award of compensation made by the learned trial judge. However, in view of Arden LJ’s reasoning in Halliday, we conclude that the appellant must in addition be entitled to nominal damages of £1.00 to reflect the fact that there was an admitted breach of section 4 of the Data Protection Act.”

Whilst it is not strictly correct to read the CR19 judgment as affirming a DPA award for £20,000 (that award was for negligence), the judgment is nonetheless interesting from a DPA perspective in a number of respects, including these:

(i) While it was conceded in Halliday that nominal damage suffices as “damage” for s. 13(1) purposes, that conclusion looks like it is being applied more widely.

(ii) One problem in Halliday (and to an extent also in AB) was the lack of cogent evidence supporting the alleged damage. The CR19 case illustrates how evidence, including expert medical evidence, can be deployed to effect in data breach cases (whether based on negligence or on the DPA).

(iii) Unlawful acts with respect to individuals’ personal information can, it seems, lead one way or another to a substantial award. The DPA may aim to offer relatively modest awards (so said the Court of Appeal in Halliday), but serious misuse or loss of personal data can nonetheless be very damaging, and the law will recognise and compensate for this where appropriate.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Facebook, FOI and children

August 6th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

The Upper Tribunal has got its teeth into personal data disputes on a number of occasions in recent months – Edem was followed by Farrand, and now Surrey Heath Borough Council v IC and Morley [2014] UKUT 0330 (AAC): Morley UT decision. Panopticon reported on the first-instance Morley decision in 2012. In brief: Mr Morley asked for information about members of the local authority’s Youth Council who had provided input into a planning application. The local authority withheld the names of the Youth Councillors (who were minors) under s. 40(2) of FOAI (personal data). In a majority decision, the First-Tier Tribunal ordered that some of those names be disclosed, principally on the grounds that it seemed that they appeared on the Youth Council’s (closed) Facebook page.

The local authority and the ICO challenged that decision. The Upper Tribunal (Judge Jacobs) has agreed with them. He found the dissenting opinion of the First-Tier Tribunal member to have been the more sophisticated (as opposed to the overly generalised analysis of the majority) and ultimately correct. The Youth Councillors’ names were correctly withheld.

In his analysis of the First Data Protection Principle, Judge Jacobs was not much bothered by whether fairness or condition 6(1) (the relevant Schedule 2 condition) should be considered first: “the latter is but a specific instance of the former”.

Judge Jacobs found that there was no sufficient interest in the disclosure of the names of the Youth Councillors. He also rejected the argument that, by putting their names on the relevant Facebook page, the data subjects had implicitly consented to public disclosure of their identities in response to such a FOIA request.

Judge Jacobs stopped short, however, of finding that the personal data of minors should never be disclosed under FOIA, i.e. that the (privacy) interests of children would always take precedence over transparency. Maturity and autonomy matter more than mere age in this context, and sometimes (as here) minors are afforded substantial scope to make their own decisions.

Morley is an important case on the intersection between children’s personal data and transparency, particularly in the social media context, but – as Judge Jacobs himself observed – “it is by no means the last word on the subject”.

There were 11KBW appearances by Joseph Barrett (for the local authority) and Heather Emmerson (for the ICO).

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

New from the Upper Tribunal: DWP work programmes, personal data. And security service algebra.

July 23rd, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

The Upper Tribunal has handed down a number of FOIA decisions in recent days. I refrain from comment or analysis, given my involvement in the cases (hopefully someone else from the Panopticon fold will oblige before long), but I post the judgments here for those who wish to read for themselves.

In DWP v IC and Zola [2014] UKUT 0334 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal dismissed the DWP’s appeal against this First-Tier Tribunal decision. The disputed information is a list of the identities of companies, charities and other organisations who host placements through the DWP’s work programmes for job seekers. Zola determination 21.07.14

In Farrand v IC and London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority [2014] UKUT 0310 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal dismissed an appeal concerning a report into a fire in a London flat, on the grounds that the requested information was the occupant’s personal data and no condition from Schedule 2 to the DPA was met. The decision discusses Common Services Agency and identification, legitimate interests, necessity and fairness. Farrand UT

Third, in Home Office v IC and Cobain (GIA/1722/2013), the Upper Tribunal has issued an interim decision allowing the appeal. This case concerns this problem: x + y = z, where z is a publicly known number, x is non-exempt information but y is exempt information (in this case, on section 23 grounds – security service information). Normally, the requester is entitled to non-exempt information, but here the automatic effect of disclosure would be to reveal the exempt information. What to do about this? As I say, an interim decision which I don’t analyse here. Have a go at the security service algebra yourself.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Academies and FOI

July 16th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

The question of whether information is ‘held’ by a public authority for FOIA or EIR purposes can raise difficulties. This is especially so where the boundaries between public and private service provision are blurred: consider outsourcing, privatisation of services, public/private partnerships, joint ventures, the use of external consultants and so on. Legal separation and practical day-to-day realities can often point in different directions in terms of who holds information on whose behalf.

Geraldine Hackett v IC and United Learning Trust (EA/2012/0265) is a recent First-Tier Tribunal decision which addresses such issues – specifically in the context of academy school provision.

The United Church Schools Foundation Limited delivers schools through two separate trusts: the United Church Schools Trust (which runs 11 private schools) and the United Learning Trust (which runs 20 academies, and receives approximately £110k of its £129k of annual income from public funds).

Para 52A Schedule 1 FOIA brings within the scope of FOIA “the proprietor of an academy” but only in respect of “information held for the purposes of the proprietor’s functions under academy arrangements.”

Geraldine Hackett asked for information about the employment package of ULT’s chief executive (pay, pension contribution, expenses etc) and of the other members of the ULT senior management team.

ULT said it did not hold the information; the information was instead held by UCST (the private school provider). The ICO agreed. So did the First-Tier Tribunal, but this was overturned by the Upper Tribunal on account of aspects of procedural fairness which had gone badly awry at first instance.

On reconsideration by a fresh First-Tier Tribunal, the ICO’s decision was overturned. The Tribunal asked itself the questions which the Upper Tribunal had invited for consideration:

“Was it really the case that ULT had delegated day-to-day running of its charitable activities to a chief executive of whose duties under his contract of employment, ULT was ignorant? Was it permissible to avoid FOIA by the device of a contract of employment made by another body?”

It applied the leading case of University of Newcastle upon Tyne v ICO and BUAV [2011] UKUT 185 (AAC) and concluded that ULT did hold the requested information for FOIA purposes. This meant that “ULT would fulfil its obligations under FOIA by disclosing not the total sums involved but that proportion, calculated in accordance with the agreement, which relates to the academies; in other words excluding that proportion which can be attributed to USCT’s private schools.”

The Tribunal noted that “in 2006 both trusts entered into an agreement with each other to apportion the expenditure on shared services” and observed that “it appeared to us from the oral and written evidence that staff work together seamlessly for all three trusts”.

Those who grapple with held/not held questions in contexts like this will wish to note the key paragraph (19) illuminating the Tribunal’s reasoning:

“We were told at the hearing, and we accept, that the disputed information is held in hard copy in one of the filing cabinets at the United Learning Head Office. Those with access to it work seamlessly, we have found, for all three trusts. They have responsibilities to all three trusts. For these purposes, we are not attracted by artificial theories suggesting that staff hold these documents only on behalf of one or two of the trusts. Looking at actualities, and applying the plain words of the statute, in our judgment the disputed information is held by ULT, even if it is also held by UCST and UCSF. This finding is consistent with the obligations of the ULT accounting officer in respect of senior officers’ payroll arrangements…”

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

In the wake of Google Spain: freedom of expression down (but not out)

July 15th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

The CJEU’s judgment in Google Spain was wrong and has created an awful mess.

That was the near-unanimous verdict of a panel of experts – including 11KBW’s Anya Proops – at a debate hosted by ITN and the Media Society on Monday 14 July and entitled ‘Rewriting History: Is the new era in Data Protection compatible with journalism?’.

The most sanguine participant was the Information Commissioner, Christopher Graham. He cautioned against a ‘Chicken Licken’ (the sky is falling in) alarmism – we should wait and see how the right to be forgotten (RTBF) pans out in practice. He was at pains to reassure the media that its privileged status in data protection law was not in fact under threat: the s. 32 DPA exemption, for example, was here to stay. There remains space, Google Spain notwithstanding, to refuse RTBF inappropriate requests, he suggested – at least as concerns journalism which is in the public interest (a characteristic which is difficult in principle and in practice).

‘I am Chicken Licken!’, was the much less sanguine stance of John Battle, ITN’s Head of Compliance. Google Spain is a serious intrusion into media freedom, he argued. This was echoed by The Telegraph’s Holly Watt, who likened the RTBF regime to book-burning.

Peter Barron, Google’s Director of Communications and Public Affairs for Europe, Africa and the Middle East, argued that in implementing its fledgling RTBF procedure, Google was simply doing as told: it had not welcomed the Google Spain judgment, but that judgment is now the law, and implementing it was costly and burdensome. On the latter point, Chris Graham seemed less than entirely sympathetic, pointing out that Google’s business model is based heavily on processing other people’s personal data.

John Whittingdale MP, Chairman of the Culture, Media & Sport Select Committee, was markedly Eurosceptic in tone. Recent data protection judgments from the CJEU have overturned what we in the UK had understood the law to be – he was referring not only to Google Spain, but also to Digital Rights Ireland (on which see my DRIP post from earlier today). The MOJ or Parliament need to intervene and restore sanity, he argued.

Bringing more legal rigour to bear was Anya Proops, who honed in on the major flaws in the Google Spain judgment. Without there having been any democratic debate (and without jurisprudential analysis), the CJEU has set a general rule whereby privacy trumps freedom of expression. This is hugely problematic in principle. It is also impracticable: the RTBF mechanism doesn’t actually work in practice, for example because it leaves Google.com (as opposed to Google.co.uk or another EU domain) untouched – a point also made by Professor Luciano Floridi, Professor of Philosophy and Ethics of Information at the University of Oxford.

There were some probing questions from the audience too. Mark Stephens, for example, asked Chris Graham how he defined ‘journalism’ (answer: ‘if it walks and quacks like a journalist’…) and how he proposed to fund the extra workload which RTBF complaints would bring for the ICO (answer: perhaps a ‘polluter pays’ approach?).

Joshua Rozenberg asked Peter Barron if there was any reason why people should not switch their default browsers to the RTBF-free Google.com (answer: no) and whether Google would consider giving aggrieved journalists rights of appeal within a Google review mechanism (the Google RTBF mechanism is still developing).

ITN is making the video available on its website this week. Those seeking further detail can also search Twitter for the hashtag #rewritinghistory or see Adam Fellows’ blog post.

The general tenor from the panel was clear: Google Spain has dealt a serious and unjustifiable blow to the freedom of expression.

Lastly, one of my favourite comments came from ITN’s John Battle, referring to the rise of data protection as a serious legal force: ‘if we’d held a data protection debate a year ago, we’d have had one man and his dog turn up. Now it pulls in big crowds’. I do not have a dog, but I have been harping on for some time about data protection’s emergence from the shadows to bang its fist on the tables of governments, security bodies, big internet companies and society at large. It surely will not be long, however, before the right to freedom of expression mounts a legal comeback, in search of a more principled and workable balance between indispensible components of a just society.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Surveillance powers to be kept alive via DRIP

July 15th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

The legal framework underpinning state surveillance of individuals’ private communications is in turmoil, and it is not all Edward Snowden’s fault. As I write this post, two hugely important developments are afoot.

Prism/Tempora

The first is the challenge by Privacy International and others to the Prism/Tempora surveillance programmes implemented by GCHQ and the security agencies. Today is day 2 of the 5-day hearing before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. To a large extent, this turmoil was unleashed by Snowden.

DRIP – the background

The second strand of the turmoil is thanks to Digital Rights Ireland and others, whose challenge to the EU’s Data Retention Directive 2006/24 was upheld by the CJEU in April of this year. That Directive provided for traffic and location data (rather than content-related information) about individuals’ online activity to be retained by communications providers for a period of 6-24 months and made available to policing and security bodies. In the UK, that Directive was implemented via the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009, which mandated retention of communications data for 12 months.

In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU held the Directive to be invalid on the grounds of incompatibility with the privacy rights enshrined under the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. Strictly speaking, the CJEU’s judgment (on a preliminary ruling) then needed to be applied by the referring courts, but in reality the foundation of the UK’s law fell away with the Digital Rights Ireland judgment. The government has, however, decided that it needs to maintain the status quo in terms of the legal powers and obligations which were rooted in the invalid Directive.

On 10 July 2014, the Home Secretary made a statement announcing that this gap in legal powers was to be plugged on a limited-term basis. A Data Retention and Investigatory Powers (DRIP) Bill would be put before Parliament, together with a draft set of regulations to be made under the envisaged Act. If passed, these would remain in place until the end of 2016, by which time longer-term solutions could be considered. Ms May said this would:

“…ensure, for now at least, that the police and other law enforcement agencies can investigate some of the criminality that is planned and takes place online. Without this legislation, we face the very prospect of losing access to this data overnight, with the consequence that police investigations will suddenly go dark and criminals will escape justice. We cannot allow this to happen.”

Today, amid the ministerial reshuffle and shortly before the summer recess, the Commons is debating DRIP on an emergency basis.

Understandably, there has been much consternation about the extremely limited time allotted for MPs to debate a Bill of such enormous significance for privacy rights (I entitled my post on the Digital Rights Ireland case “Interfering with the fundamental rights of practically the entire European population”, which is a near-verbatim quote from the judgment).

DRIP – the data retention elements

The Bill is short. A very useful summary can be found in the Standard Note from the House of Commons Library (authored by Philippa Ward).

Clause 1 provides power for the Secretary of State to issue a data retention notice on a telecommunications services provider, requiring them to retain certain data types (limited to those set out in the Schedule to the 2009 Regulations) for up to 12 months. There is a safeguard that the Secretary of State must consider whether it is “necessary and proportionate” to give the notice for one or more of the purposes set out in s22(2) of RIPA.

Clause 2 then provides the relevant definitions.

The Draft Regulations explain the process in more detail. Note in particular regulation 5 (the matters the Secretary of State must consider before giving a notice) and regulation 9 (which provides for oversight by the Information Commissioner of the requirements relating to integrity, security and destruction of retained data).

DRIP – the RIPA elements

DRIP is also being used to clarify (says the government) or extend (say some critics) RIPA 2000. In this respect, as commentators such as David Allen Green have pointed out, it is not clear why the emergency legislation route is necessary.

Again, to borrow the nutshells from the House of Commons Library’s Standard Note:

Clause 3 amends s5 of RIPA regarding the Secretary of State’s power to issue interception warrants on the grounds of economic well-being.

Clause 4 aims to clarify the extra-territorial reach of RIPA in in relation to both interception and communications data by adding specific provisions. This confirms that requests for interception and communications data to overseas companies that are providing communications services within the UK are subject to the legislation.

Clause 5 clarifies the definition of “telecommunications service” in RIPA to ensure that internet-based services, such as webmail, are included in the definition.

Criticism

The Labour front bench is supporting the Coalition. A number of MPs, including David Davis and Tom Watson, have been vociferous in their opposition (see for example the proposed amendments tabled by Watson and others here). So too have numerous academics and commentators. I won’t try to link to all of them here (as there are too many). Nor can I link to a thorough argument in defence of DRIP (as I have not been able to find one). For present purposes, an excellent forensic analysis comes from Graham Smith at Cyberleagle.

I don’t seek to duplicate that analysis. It is, however, worth remembering this: the crux of the CJEU’s judgment was that the Directive authorised such vast privacy intrusions that stringent safeguards were required to render it proportionate. In broad terms, that proportionately problem can be fixed in two ways: reduce the extent of the privacy intrusions and/or introduce much better safeguards. DRIP does not seek to do the former. The issue is whether it offers sufficient safeguards for achieving an acceptable balance between security and privacy.

MPs will consider that today and Peers later this week. Who knows? – courts may even be asked for their views in due course.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Some results may have been removed under data protection law in Europe. Learn more.

July 3rd, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

This is the message that now regularly greets those using Google to search for information on named individuals. It relates, of course, to the CJEU’s troublesome Google Spain judgment of 13 May 2014.

I certainly wish to learn more.

So I take Google up on its educational offer and click through to its FAQ page, where the folks at Google tell me inter alia that “Since this ruling was published on 13 May 2014, we’ve been working around the clock to comply. This is a complicated process because we need to assess each individual request and balance the rights of the individual to control his or her personal data with the public’s right to know and distribute information”.

The same page also leads me to the form on which I can ask Google to remove from its search results certain URLs about me. I need to fill in gaps like this: “This URL is about me because… This page should not be included as a search result because…” 

This is indeed helpful in terms of process, but I want to understand more about the substance of decision-making. How does (and/or should) Google determine whether or not to accede to my request? Perhaps understandably (as Google remarks, this is a complicated business on which the dust is yet to settle), Google doesn’t tell me much about that just yet.

So I look to the obvious source – the CJEU’s judgment itself – for guidance. Here I learn that I can in principle ask that “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant” information about me not be returned through a Google search. I also get some broad – and quite startling – rules of thumb, for example at paragraph 81, which tells me this:

“In the light of the potential seriousness of that interference, it is clear that it cannot be justified by merely the economic interest which the operator of such an engine has in that processing. However, inasmuch as the removal of links from the list of results could, depending on the information at issue, have effects upon the legitimate interest of internet users potentially interested in having access to that information, in situations such as that at issue in the main proceedings a fair balance should be sought in particular between that interest and the data subject’s fundamental rights under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter. Whilst it is true that the data subject’s rights protected by those articles also override, as a general rule, that interest of internet users, that balance may however depend, in specific cases, on the nature of the information in question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on the interest of the public in having that information, an interest which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the data subject in public life.”

So it seems that, in general (and subject to the sensitivity of the information and my prominence in public life), my privacy rights trump Google’s economic rights and other people’s rights to find information about me in this way. So the CJEU has provided some firm steers on points of principle.

But still I wish to learn more about how these principles will play out in practice. Media reports in recent weeks have told us about the volume of ‘right to be forgotten’ requests received by Google.

The picture this week has moved on from volumes to particulars. In the past few days, we have begun to learn how Google’s decisions filter back to journalists responsible for the content on some of the URLs which objectors pasted into the forms they sent to Google. We learn that journalists and media organisations, for example, are now being sent messages like this:

“Notice of removal from Google Search: we regret to inform you that we are no longer able to show the following pages from your website in response to certain searches on European versions of Google.”

Unsurprisingly, some of those journalists find this puzzling and/or objectionable. Concerns have been ventilated in the last day or two, most notably by the BBC’s Robert Peston (who feels that, through teething problems with the new procedures, he has been ‘cast into oblivion’) and The Guardian’s James Ball (who neatly illustrates some of the oddities of the new regime). See also The Washington Post’s roundup of UK media coverage.

That coverage suggests that the Google Spain ruling – which made no overt mention of free expression rights under Article 10 ECHR – has started to bite into the media’s freedom. The Guardian’s Chris Moran, however, has today posted an invaluable piece clarifying some misconceptions about the right to be forgotten. Academic commentators such as Paul Bernal have also offered shrewd insights into the fallout from Google Spain.

So, by following the trail from Google’s pithy new message, I am able to learn a fair amount about the tenor of this post-Google Spain world.

Inevitably, however, given my line of work, I am interested in the harder edges of enforcement and litigation: in particular, if someone objects to the outcome of a ‘please forget me’ request to Google, what exactly can they do about it?

On such questions, it is too early to tell. Google says on its FAQ page that “we look forward to working closely with data protection authorities and others over the coming months as we refine our approach”. For its part, the ICO tells us that it and its EU counterparts are working hard on figuring this out. Its newsletter from today says for example that:

“The ICO and its European counterparts on the Article 29 Working Party are working on guidelines to help data protection authorities respond to complaints about the removal of personal information from search engine results… The recommendations aim to ensure a consistent approach by European data protection authorities in response to complaints when takedown requests are refused by the search engine provider.”

So for the moment, there remain lots of unanswered questions. For example, the tone of the CJEU’s judgment is that DPA rights will generally defeat economic rights and the public’s information rights. But what about a contest between two individuals’ DPA rights?

Suppose, for example, that I am an investigative journalist with substantial reputational and career investment in articles about a particular individual who then persuades Google to ensure that my articles do not surface in EU Google searches for his name? Those articles also contain my name, work and opinions, i.e. they also contain my personal data. In acceding to the ‘please forget me’ request without seeking my input, could Google be said to have processed my personal data unfairly, whittling away my online personal and professional output (at least to the extent that the relevant EU Google searches are curtailed)? Could this be said to cause me damage or distress? If so, can I plausibly issue a notice under s. 10 of the DPA, seek damages under s. 13, or ask the ICO to take enforcement action under s. 40?

The same questions could arise, for example, if my personal backstory is heavily entwined with that of another person who persuades Google to remove from its EU search results articles discussing both of us – that may be beneficial for the requester, but detrimental to me in terms of the adequacy of personal data about me which Google makes available to the interested searcher.

So: some results may have been removed under data protection law in Europe, and I do indeed wish to learn more. But I will have to wait.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

GCHQ’s internet surveillance – privacy and free expression join forces

July 3rd, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

A year ago, I blogged about Privacy International’s legal challenge – alongside Liberty – against GCHQ, the Security Services and others concerning the Prism/Tempora programmes which came to public attention following Edward Snowden’s whistleblowing. That case is now before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. It will be heard for 5 days, commencing on 14 July.

Privacy International has also brought a second claim against GCHQ: in May 2014, it issued proceedings concerning the use of ‘hacking’ tools and software by intelligence services.

It has been announced this week that Privacy International is party to a third challenge which has been filed with the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. This time, the claim is being brought alongside 7 internet service providers: GreenNet (UK), Chaos Computer Club (Germany); GreenHost (Netherlands); Jimbonet (Korea), Mango (Zimbabwe), May First/People Link (US) and Riseup (US).

The claim is interesting on a number of fronts. One is the interplay between global reach (see the diversity of the claimants’ homes) and this specific legal jurisdiction (the target is GCHQ and the jurisdiction is the UK – as opposed, for example, to bringing claims in the US). Another is that it sees private companies – and therefore Article 1 Protocol 1 ECHR issues about property, business goodwill and the like – surfacing in the UK’s internet surveillance debate.

Also, the privacy rights not only of ‘ordinary’ citizens (network users) but also specifically those of the claimants’ employees are being raised.

Finally, this claim sees the right to free expression under Article 10 ECHR – conspicuously absent, for example, in the Google Spain judgment – flexing its muscle in the surveillance context. Privacy and free expression rights are so often in tension, but here they make common cause.

The claims are as follows (quoting from the claimants’ press releases):

(1) By interfering with network assets and computers belonging to the network providers, GCHQ has contravened the UK Computer Misuse Act and Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol (A1AP) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the individual’s peaceful enjoyment of their possessions

(2) Conducting surveillance of the network providers’ employees is in contravention of Article 8 ECHR (the right to privacy) and Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression)

(3) Surveillance of the network providers’ users that is made possible by exploitation of their internet infrastructure, is in contravention of Arts. 8 and 10 ECHR; and

(4) By diluting the network providers’ goodwill and relationship with their users, GCHQ has contravened A1AP ECHR.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin