NEW TECHNIQUES FOR APPLYING RIPA – OUTCOME OF HOME OFFICE CONSULTATION

November 10th, 2009 by Anya Proops

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) has attracted a considerable amount of negative publicity over the past couple of years. In no small part, this has been due to public outcry in response media reports of local authorities using their powers under RIPA to engage in activities such as monitoring the use of domestic wheelie bins, recording dog-fouling incidents on camera and carrying out surveillance on families suspected of trying to cheat the school catchment system (see further the discussion of the case of Paton v Poole Borough Council below). Concerns have been expressed by members of the public as well as privacy campaigners that such actions on the part of local authorities constitute abuses of their powers both because the surveillance powers of the state should not be used for trivial purposes and because there has been a failure on the part of the authority to achieve a proper balance between the rights of the state to identify civil and criminal wrongdoing and the individual’s right to have his or her privacy respected. Those concerns resulted in the Home Office commencing a consultation in April 2009 on proposals to introduce new RIPA techniques which would purportedly help ensure that RIPA would only be used when it was necessary and proportionate. Last week, the Home Office published a summary of the responses to those proposals along with an announcement. In the announcement, the view expressed by the Minister for State Security, Counter-Terrorism and Policing, David Hanson, was that the responses to the consultation had been broadly positive. He said that, subject to certain minor amendments, he would now take steps to introduce the proposals as secondary legislation. The announcement suggests that the new legislation will aim to:

  • clarify the test of necessity and proportionality so techniques will not be used for trivial purposes such as investigating dog fouling or people putting bins out a day early
  • raise the rank of the authorising officer for RIPA techniques in local authorities to senior executive at a minimum of ‘Director’ level
  • give elected councillors a role in overseeing the way local authorities use covert
    investigatory techniques
  • require constituents’ communications with MPs on constituency business to be
    treated as confidential information, and therefore subject to authorisation by a
    higher rank of officer
  • treat covert surveillance of legal consultations as ‘intrusive’ rather than ‘directed’
    surveillance, meaning that it can only be carried out by a very limited number of
    public authorities, primarily the police and intelligence agencies, and only with
    independent approval
  • clarify how provisions currently in the Policing and Crime Bill will reduce
    bureaucracy relating to RIPA in police collaborative units comprising two or
    more forces

It also appears that, following a proposal by the Local Government Association, local authorities will need to appoint a single official to be responsible for ensuring that all authorising officers are of an appropriate standard. Notably, the Home Office rejected suggestions that a more radical approach should be adopted, namely removing local authorities from the scope of RIPA altogether.

Coincidentally, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, chaired by its President, Mummery LJ, was itself hearing a complaint last week brought under s. 65 RIPA that a particular local authority had unlawfully exercised its surveillance powers under RIPA. In Paton v Poole Borough Council, which was heard on 5 and 6 November, the IPT was called upon to decide whether the Poole BC had acted unlawfully under RIPA when it conducted directed surveillance of Ms Paton and her family. The surveillance had been conducted in circumstances where the council suspected that Ms Poole may have been dishonestly trying to abuse the school catchment system by giving a false address when applying for a place for her child at a local school. It was accepted by the council before the IPT that, in fact, its suspicions about Ms Paton had proved to be unfounded. However, the council nonetheless sought to maintain the position before the IPT that the surveillance constituted a necessary, proportionate and, hence, lawful exercise of its powers under RIPA. In advancing this case, it was argued on behalf of the council that there existed no simple means of uncovering fraudulent abuses of the school catchment system that did not involve any invasion of privacy rights. The council was represented by 11KBW’s Ben Hooper.

WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN?

November 10th, 2009 by Timothy Pitt-Payne QC

We call them “data protection duck outs”.  The New Zealanders call them “BOTPAs” (standing for “Because of the Privacy Act”).  Organisations do something silly, and then blame it on data protection legislation.

There’s a nice recent example. A parcel was addressed to a 9 day old baby.  Initially the Royal Mail wouldn’t deliver it to her grandfather, apparently because the Data Protection Act required the baby to sign for it personally.  Not surprisingly, the ICO has confirmed that the Act does not require anything of the kind.

OFCOM & THE AGGREGATION OF PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS: UPDATE

November 9th, 2009 by Anya Proops

On 17 November 2009, the Supreme Court will hear the Information Commissioner’s appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Office of Communications v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 90 (Ofcom). In Ofcom, the Court of Appeal held that, when multiple exceptions were engaged in respect of particular information, the public interest test provided for under regulation 12(1)(b) of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 would operate so as to entitle the public authority to aggregate all the different public interest factors relating to all applicable exceptions in a single, compendious public interest balancing exercise. This judgment was controversial, not least because it represented a departure from the well-established approach of tailoring public interest considerations to the individual exception in issue. Notably, in a recent Information Tribunal decision, the Tribunal highlighted some of the practical difficulties posed by the adoption of the aggregate approach to the public interest test (South Gloucestershire v Information Commissioner (EA/2009/0032), §§48-52). 11KBW’s Clive Lewis and Akhlaq Choudhury will be appearing on behalf of the Commissioner in the Supreme Court.

ACCESSING LOCAL AUTHORITY INFORMATION UNDER THE AUDIT COMMISSION ACT 1998

November 9th, 2009 by Anya Proops

It is often thought by members of the public that the only way to access information relating to how local authorities are spending public monies is through the application of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. However, a recent judgment of the High Court has highlighted that such information may also be accessed in certain circumstances under another much less well known enactment, namely the Audit Commission Act 1998 (ACA). In summary, section 15 ACA permits ‘any person interested’ (e.g. local council tax payers) to inspect a local authority’s accounts and documents ‘relating to’ those accounts at the time of the authority’s annual audit.

In Veolia ES Nottinghamshire Ltd v Nottinghamshire CC & Ors [2009] EWHC 2382 (Admin), an inspection request was submitted to the Nottinghamshire CC by an interested person. The documents falling within the ambit of the request included a particular waste management contract which Veolia had entered into with the Council, along with invoices which Veolia had supplied to the Council under the contract. The Council decided that it was obliged to permit inspection of these documents under s. 15 ACA. Veolia challenged that decision by way of judicial review. Evidently, in mounting that challenge, Veolia was concerned that the information contained in the documents was commercially sensitive and should not therefore be permitted to enter the public domain under s. 15. Veolia’s case before the High Court was advanced principally on the basis that inspection should not be permitted under s. 15 as the contract and the invoices did not ‘relate to’ the local authority’s accounts. This argument was firmly rejected by Cranston J. He held that the words ‘relating to’ were sufficiently flexible that they could accommodate the documents in issue.

In reaching this conclusion, Cranson J evidently had in mind that the function of s. 15 is to enable interested persons to inspect documents which reveal precisely how the local authority is spending public monies. He concluded, in effect, that such a function would be frustrated if such persons could not consider the various contracts and invoices under which the local authority made payments to third parties.

It is apparent from the judgment in Veolia, that considerations relating to commercial sensitivity and confidentiality will not be relevant to the decision as to whether documents may be inspected under s. 15. This very generous approach to accessing commercial information under the ACA is to be contrasted with the more restrictive approach adopted under FOIA and the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (see further the specific exemptions afforded under those enactments in respect of confidential and commercial information; and see also South Gloucestershire Council v Information Commissioner (EA/2009/0032) for a recent example of how these exemptions apply in practice – see further the post on this case). Veolia’s application for permission to appeal against Cranston J’s judgment is currently being considered by the Court of Appeal.

11KBW’s Michael Supperstone QC, Tim Pitt-Payne and Peter Oldham all appeared in the case.

 

Abortion statistics: identification of patients and doctors held to be unlikely

November 2nd, 2009 by Robin Hopkins

In 2003, the Department of Health significantly reduced the detail of publicly available statistics on abortion operations: for example, no information was any longer to be released about post-24-week abortions carried out on the grounds of foetal medical defects. The Department relied principally on s. 40 FOIA in refusing the Prolife Alliance’s request for more detailed data. The Information Tribunal has, however, ordered the statistics to be disclosed: see Department of Health v IC (Additional Party: the Pro Life Alliance) (EA/2008/0074). The Tribunal agreed with the Department that the requested abortion statistics, although entirely anonymised, did constitute personal data because they were not anonymous in the hands of the data controller. The Department’s principal concern, namely the inferential identification of doctors or patients, was not, however considered ‘likely’ in the circumstances. This factual finding meant that, in the Tribunal’s view, the release of the requested personal data was fair and lawful and that (under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 2 to the DPA) the potential prejudice to patients and doctors was outweighed by legitimate third party interests in (inter alia) monitoring compliance with abortion law, identifying abortion trends, informing public debate and encouraging accountability of medical practitioners. The decision is of note for its detailed analysis of the ways in which individuals might be identified from statistical data, and for the Tribunal’s reliance on the Corporate Officer of the House of Commons litigation (in its various stages) for guidance on the balancing test under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 2 to the DPA.